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POWER OF THE COURT TO MODIFY AN ALIMONY
DECREE BASED ON AN AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
Hunt v. Hunt
169 Ohio St. 276, 159 N.E.2d 430 (1959)
A divorce decree was granted to Virginia Hunt in 1954 for the
aggression of her husband, Paul Hunt. Incorporated into the decree was
an agreement between the parties (which did not constitute a property
settlement and was not related to the support of children), establishing
alimony in the amount of $150 a month. In 1956, following the mar-
riage of Virginia Hunt to a man capable of providing her with adequate
support, Paul Hunt moved to have the alimony award modified. On
appeal from the dismissal of the motion, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled
that even though jurisdiction to modify the award had not been ex-
pressly reserved in the decree, by remarrying, Virginia Hunt was held to
have abandoned the provisions in the decree for her benefit and to have
elected to rely solely upon her new husband for support. Reservation of
jurisdiction to modify by the decreeing court was implied because the
supreme court declared it to be against public policy to require any man
to support another man's wife. Accordingly, the alimony award was ter-
minated.
The most controversial issue affected by this decision concerns the
power of the court to modify a decree based on an agreement of the
parties and awarding permanent installment payments. Ohio has con-
sistently recognized the power of the court to modify a continuing ali-
mony or support decree when not based on an agreement of the parties,
irrespective of any express reservation to do so in the original decree.'
Dictum in some of the early cases intimated that the court's jurisdiction
was continuous whenever installment payments were awarded.2 However,
despite a dictum in a 1935 case stating that a divorce decree incorporating
a separation agreement supersedes the agreement,3 the Ohio Supreme
Court has accepted the premise that exercising the power to modify a
1 Smedley v. State, 95 Ohio St. 141, 115 N.E. 1022 (1916); Olney v. Watts,
43 Ohio St. 499, 3 N.E. 354 (1885) ; Heckert v. Heckert, 57 Ohio App. 421, 14 N.E.2d
428 (1936). The majority of American jurisdictions deny this power by judicial
decision, see Annot., 127 A.L.R. 741 (1940).
2 Smedley v. State, supra note 1, at 143, "It is well settled that the jurisdiction
of a court in an alimony case is continuing."; Heckert v. Heckert, supra note 1
(to the effect that reservation of jurisdiction is implied in an installment decree).
Also, see the following cases where this principle is recognized, but for varying
reasons the court was held to have exhausted its jurisdiction, Garver v. Garver,
102 Ohio St. 443, 133 N.E. 551 (1921) (prior amended decree terminating ali-
mony) ; Petersine v. Thomas, 28 Ohio St. 596 (1876) (gross allotment) ; Robert-
son v. Robertson, 61 Ohio App. 458, 22 N.E.2d 744 (1938) (gross allotment);
Clough v. Long, 8 Ohio App. 420 (1918) (property awarded in lieu of a gross
allotment).
3 Holloway v. Holloway, 130 Ohio St. 214, 198 N.E. 579 (1935), though not
overruled, this case has not been followed in Ohio.
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decree based on an agreement of the parties would impair the obligations
of a contract.4 The court has repeatedly asserted the law to be that:
An alimony decree based upon an agreement between
the parties is not subject to modification by a court after term
in the absence of mistake, misrepresentation or fraud and in the
absence of a reservation of jurisdiction with reference thereto.'
Ohio's view in this area of the law has been rejected in the vast majority
of common law jurisdictions, most of which recognize the power of the
court to modify a decree regardless of whether or not it is based on an
agreement of the parties. The majority theory is that the agreement is
a contract separate from the decree and modification of the decree does
not impair the obligations of the contract.6
Despite this broad denial of jurisdiction by the court, exceptions to
the general rule have been allowed. However, in attempting to qualify
under an exception, one discovers that he is confronted by that evershift-
ing concept, public policy. A short analysis of the landmark decisions con-
cerning modification of child support decrees based on an agreement of
the parties, will demonstrate how the supreme court has turned public
policy on and off in order to find, or deny, the power to modify.
On a motion to increase the child support, decided in 193 0,7 the
supreme court ruled that in any decree affecting children, public policy
required that the state always have the power to provide for the child's
welfare, therefore, continuing jurisdiction must be implied even when
based on an agreement of the parties. Then in 1941, in Tullis v. Tullis,'
the court limited this continuing jurisdiction solely to motions to increase
the award. The reason given was that public policy, as stated above, could
not justify impairing the contract by decreasing the amount. Eleven
years later, in Seitz v. Seitz,9 this denial of jurisdiction to decrease the
4 For a discussion of the reasons, both pro and con, for this doctrine, see
Tullis v. Tullis, 138 Ohio St. 187, 34 N.E.2d 212 (1941).
5 Mozden v. Mozden, 162 Ohio St. 169, 122 N.E.2d 295 (1954); Newman v.
Newman, 161 Ohio St. 247, 118 N.E.2d 649 (1954); Law v. Law, 64 Ohio St.
369, 60 N.E. 560 (1901); Sinclair v. Sinclair, 98 Ohio App. 308, 129 N.E.2d 311
(1954) ; Joshua v. Joshua, 53 Ohio L. Abs. 561, 87 N.E.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1948) ;
Sedam v. Sedam, 83 Ohio App. 138, 78 N.E.2d 914 (1948); Kintner v. Kintner,
78 Ohio App. 324, 65 N.E.2d 156 (1946); Nash v. Nash, 77 Ohio App. 155, 65
N.E.2d 728 (1945); Heilburn v. Heilburn, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 369, 34 N.E.2d 310
(Ct. App. 1941) ; Hofer v. Hofer, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 486, 42 N.E.2d 165 (Ct. App.
1940); Miller v. Miller, 79 Ohio L. Abs. 599, 153 N.E.2d 355 (C.P. 1958).
GAnnot., 166 A.L.R. 675 (1947).
7 Corbett v. Corbett, 123 Ohio St. 76, 174 N.E. 10 (1930) ; also, see Connolly
v. Connolly, 16 Ohio App. 92 (1922).
8 Tullis v. Tullis, 138 Ohio St. 187, 34 N.E.2d 212 (1941) ; also, see Campbell
v. Campbell, 46 Ohio App. 197, 188 N.E. 300 (1933).
9 Seitz v. Seitz, 156 Ohio St. 516, 103 N.E.2d 741 (1952). Compare Robrock v.
Robrock, 167 Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421 (1958) ; Stafford v. Stafford, 139 N.E.2d
347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 99 Ohio App. 7, 139 N.E'2d
471 (1956).
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award in Tullis was limited only to those occasions in which no words
implying, or expressing reservation of jurisdiction could be found in the
decree. Three judges stated their desire to overrule Tullis completely.
Thus, due to the tenuous premise of the inviolability of a contract
when incorporated into a decree, Ohio courts had gotten into the dif-
ficult situation of having to look to the facts of a controversy to determine
whether circumstances are sufficient to warrant invoking "public policy"
to grant the court power to modify the decree. This was certainly "back-
ing into" an equitable solution which could be readily attained by dis-
carding the artificial distinction developed by the Ohio courts, between
decrees incorporating an agreement and those based solely on the judge's
findings. The courts, by accepting the prevailing view of the separate con-
tract, could declare that they have the power to modify any decree award-
ing installment payments and concentrate future decisions toward establish-
ing the circumstances under which this power should be invoked.
Unfortunately, the opinion in the Hunt case places the power to
modify an alimony decree on the same basis as child support decrees,
public policy. Armed with ample Ohio authority that remarriage of the
wife provides adequate grounds for an application by the former hus-
band to be relieved from further alimony payments,'0 it was not difficult
for the Court to find that the contract obligations in the argeement must
yield to the public policy concept that no man should be forced to support
another man's wife. A careful comparison of the opinion in the Hunt
case with that in Tullis indicates that they are based on the same con-
siderations, even though Hunt permits decreases and Tullis increases. The
public policy of protecting the husband as set forth in Hunt, would allow
impairment of the contract only to the extent of decreasing the amount.
On the other hand, protecting a child's welfare as in Tullis, justifies only
an increase in the child support.
The inequities which result from basing the power to modify
solely on public policy can be readily seen in the following hypothetical
situation. A divorce decree, incorporating an agreement of the parties,
establishes permanent alimony at a certain amount per month. Following
the divorce, the wife becomes gainfully employed, fully able to adequately
10 Olney v. Watts, 43 Ohio St. 499, 3 N.E. 354 (1885); King v. King, 38 Ohio
St. 370 (1882); Madden v. Madden, 11 Ohio C.C.R.(n.s.) 238 (Cir. Ct. 1908),
aff'd 83 Ohio St. 506, 94 N.E. 1110 (1911); Baker v. Baker, 4 Ohio App. 170
(1915) ; Wolfe v. Wolfe, 124 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
The burden is usually on the husband to prove remarriage of the wife and
ability of the new husband to furnish adequate support. To continue the award,
the wife must show extraordinary circumstances. Apparently the only circumstance
found to be sufficient in Ohio is the invalidity of the remarriage, Brenholts v.
Brenholts, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 309 (Ct. App. 1935).
Four states, California, Illinois, New Jersey and New York, have enacted
legislation which automatically terminates all alimony payable to the wife upon
her marriage. For a complete discussion on the effect of remarriage of the
wife on decrees for alimony, see Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 270 (1956).
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support herself. The husband is injured, losing his job, and therefore,
becomes unable to meet the alimony payments awarded in the decree.
Certainly these changed circumstances would dictate that the payments
at least be temporarily terminated or decreased. However, since the hus-
band is still under a legal duty to support his ex-wife, public policy will
not justify impairing the obligations of the contract until, or unless, the
wife remarries. Because of these decisions, the status of the law is that
unless the party moving for modification of the decree has managed to
have included in the decree, along with the agreement, reservation of the
power to modify, he is faced with the difficult tack of persuading the
court that his situation is such that public policy should be invoked in
order to justify finding the power to modify the decree.
By refusing to overrule the early cases establishing the distinction
between decrees," and by basing its power to modify in the Hunt case on
public policy, the Supreme Court failed to take advantage of a perfect
situation to end the confusion as to when the court has the power to
modify a decree. More equitable, and certainly more coherent results
could be obtained by repudiating the contract and public policy theories
and recognizing the power of the court to modify all decrees ordering
installment payments.
Kenneth R. Millsor
I Supra note 5.
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